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Editor

LAw-PICKETING-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-

FALSE BANNERING IN CONNECTION WITH PEACEFUL PICKETING.-

In a recent case an employer was peacefully picketed by a union
using banners containing false statements. An injunction was
granted against the picketing over two contentions of the union:
(I1) that the situation fell within the rule that equity will not
grant injunctive relief against the publication of libel or slander,
and (2) that a policy of a state, characterizing the use of false
statements as unlawful, and therefore within the permissible limits
which the state might impose upon peaceful picketing, was a violation of the constitutional right of free speech." It is the purpose of
this note to analyze these contentions to ascertain whether the rule
that equity will not enjoin defamation has been abrogated by this
decision, and to explore the more recent identification of peaceful
"Magill Bros., Inc. v. Building Service Employees' International Union.
(1942) 20 Cal. (2d) 506, 127 P. (2d) 542.
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picketing with the right of free speech to determine its proscriptive
effect against injunctions in such a case.
1.

EQUITY WILL NOT RESTRAIN DEFAMATION

The practice of equity to refuse to enjoin a libel was based in
part, at least, on the policy of permitting freedom of expression.
The rule has been abrogated in England by an accident of statutory development.' In America the rule still persists, subject to
the modification that if the publication or other expression is a
means of committing a tort which may be restrained, the publication
itself may be enjoined, regardless of whether it amounts to a
libel.4 In the field of labor law this principle has been applied
to statements made in newspapers or by bannering, in aid of an
illegal strike or boycott." The injunction is said to be aimed not
at the publication, but at the coercion rendering the strike or
boycott illegal ;6 and in such a situation its issuance by equity has
been held not to violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech.

7

Following the principle underlying the decisions in these boy2

McClintock, Equity (1936) sec. 151, p. 272; Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defamation and. Injuries to Personality, (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev.
640; 3 (1925) 11 Va. L. Rev. 225.
McClintock, Equity (1936) sec. 151, p. 272; Walsh, Equity (1930) see.
51, p. 263; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to
Personality, (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640, 665.
4Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 31
Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, rev'd on other grounds, Gompers v. United
States, (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed. 1115; Sherry v.
Perkins, (1888) 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307, 9 Am. St. Rep. 689; Lawrence
Trust Co. v. Sun-American Publishing Co., (1923) 245 Mass. 262, 139
N. E.5 655.
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 31
Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed.. 797, rev'd on other grounds. Gompers v. United
States, (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed. 1115; Coeur D'Alene
Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, (C.C.D. Idaho 1892) 51 Fed. 260, 19 L. R. A.
382; Jordahl v. -ayda, (1905) 1 Cal. App. 696, 82 Pac. 1079; Vebb v. Cooks',
Waiters' & Waitresses' Union No. 748, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 205 S. W.
465; Thomas v. Cincinnati Railway, (C.C.D. Ohio 1894) 62 Fed. 803. See
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,
(1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640, 655.
GSee Coeur D'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, (C.C.D. Idaho
1892) 51 Fed. 260, 267, 19 L. R. A. 382; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, (1898) 118 Mich. 497, 527, 77 N. W. 13, 42 L. R. A. 407.
74 Am. St. Rep. 421.
7Coeur D'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union (C.C.D. Idaho 1892) 51
Fed. 260, 19 L. R. A. 382; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union,
(1898) 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13, 42 L. R. A. 407, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421;
Thomas v. Cincinnati Railway, (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) 62 Fed. 803; Jordahl
v. Hayda, (1905) 1 Cal. App. 696, 82 Pac. 1079; Rocky Mountain Bell
Telephone Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, (D. Mont. 1907) 156 Fed.
809.
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cott and strike cases, the court in the instant case took the position
that since the utterance of falsehood was unlawful, the otherwise
lawful picketing, when accompanied by false statements, became
illegal and hence open to restraint on the ground that the utterance
of the falsehood was not being inhibited, but rather the unlawful
picketing. It is questionable whether, in light of the recognized
right of labor to be heard concerning its dissatisfaction with industrial conditions, the rationale of the principle that equity will
enjoin a publication that is part of a wrong which would be enjoined itself, is justifiably applied to the false bannering situations
In the illegal boycott and strike cases, such as Beck V. Railway
Teamsters' Protective Union9 and Coeur D'Alene M1fining Co. v.
.Mlincrs" Union, 0 it was. not the publications as such which
rendered the labor disputes illegal. but rather the coercion thereby
engendered. At the time of those cases, publications in the course
(f a labor dispute were considered a disguise for inarticulated
threats; the courts were really laying down the principle that
force could not be used to win victories on economic fronts. On
the other hand, where the "evidentiary conclusion" of coercion
is not accepted, it is clear that equity will not grant an injunction
against false statements uttered in the course of an industrial dispute," since the constitutional guarantee of free speech, which
N"At the time of the Beck Case, it was the view of many courts that
picketing could not be carried on peacefully-the display of banners was regarded as a subterfuge for unspoken threats. . . . The court was not laying
down an ultimate principle of law but was expressing an evidentiary conclusion of the time to illustrate the principle that you must not demonstrate
or intimate that force will be used to achieve victory in the economic dispute. Such a conclusion of another year should not necessarily control the
experience of today . . . the dissemination of information about a labor

dispute near the premises of the employer no longer has inherent in its
nature the 'covert and unspoken threats' which promoted the decision in
the Beck Case." Book Tower Garage, Inc. v. Local No. 415, (1940) 295
Mich. 580, 584, 295 N. W. 320.
"(1898) 118 Mich. 497. 77 N. W. 13, 42 L. R. A. 407, 74 Am. St. Rep.
421. 4o(C.C.D. Idaho 1892) 51 Fed. 260, 19 L. R. A. 382.
"In Coeur D'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, (C.C.D. Idaho 1892)
51 Fed. 260, 267, 19 L. R. A. 382, the distinction is clearly made: ". . . when
the acts complained of consist of such material misrepresentation of a business that they tend to its injury ... the offense is simply a libel; and in this
country the courts have with great unanimity held that they will not interfere
by injunction. . . . On the contrary, when the attempt to injure consists of
acts or words which will operate to intimidate ... the courts have with nearly
equal unanimity interposed by injunction." For statements to the same
effect see Richter Bros. v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, (1890) 24 Weekly
L. Bull. 189, 192, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 45; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, (1898) 118 Mich. 497, 527, 77 N. ,V. 13, 42 L. R. A. 407, 74
Am. St. Rep. 421; Marx & Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, (1902) 168 Mo.
133. 67 S. W. 391, 56 L. R. A. 951, 90 Am. St. Rep. 440; Lietzman v. Radio
Broadcasting Station, (1935) 282 11. App. 203, 213; see discussion in (1932)
2 Brooklyn L. Rev. 61, 62.
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divests it of jurisdiction to restrain libel in other situations, applies
equally in industrial disputes. 12 Therefore, in light of the fact
that injunctions are not issued in boycott and strike cases where
the "unlawfulness" consists merely of false statements, it would
seem that an injunction should not have been issued in the instant
case.
Moreover, in another case, Near v. State of Minnesota," where
there was an attempt under a state statute to restrain a defamatory
newspaper, reasoning almost identical to that in the instant case
was denied validity. The justification of the statute was based
on the fact that it dealt not with publication per se, but with
the "business" of publishing, and since the latter constituted
a nuisance, it could be enjoined. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the subterfuge of characterizing a thing that can
14
not be restrained as one which can, would not be countenanced.
2.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF PEACEFUL PICKETING WITH
FREE SPEECH

Climaxing the protracted struggle of labor against "government by injunction,"'" the recent Supreme Court decisions basing
the right to peacefully picket on constitutional guarantees of free
speech' 6 have clearly established that in balancing social interests,
the preservation of free speech is of more precious metal than the
7
emancipation of enterprise from the burdens of the picket line.
"-Richter v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, (1890) 24 Weekly L. Bull.
189, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 45; Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, (1918) 19 Ariz.
379, 171 Pac. 121; Ex parte Tucker, (1920) 110 Tex. 335, 220 S."W.75;
App. 203.
Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station. (1935) 282 Ill.
1"(1931) 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357, discussed in

(1931) 16
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97.

'4Cf. Lovell v. Griffin, (1938) 303 U. S.444, 452. 58 Sup. Ct. 666. 82
L. Ed. 949, discussed in (1939) 23 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 375.
and Green, The Labor Injunction (1930) p. 88.
"Frankfurter
' 6Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S.88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed.
1093, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 238; Carlson v.
California, (1940) 310 U. S.106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746. 84 L. Ed. 1104: American
Federation of Labor v. Swing. (1941) 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568. 85
L. Ed. 855, rehearing denied (1941) 312 U. S. 715, 61 Sup. Ct. 735. 85
L. Ed. 1145, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 640: Bakerv
& Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, (1942) 315 U. S.759, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed.
740; see Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, (1937) 301 U. S.468, 478, 57 Sup. Ct.
857, 81 L. Ed. 1229; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Co..
(1941) 312 U. S.287, 297, 61 Sup. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, rehearing denied
(1941) 312 U. S.715, 61 Sup. Ct. 803, 85 L. Ed. 1145, discussed in (1941)
25 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 640; cf. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, (1942) 315
U. S.437, 62 Sup. Ct. 706, 86 L. Ed. 567.
17See American Federation of Labor v. Swing, (1941) 312 U. S.321, 326,
61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855, rehearing denied (1941) 312 U. S. 715, 61
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Obviously, therefore, where a state interferes with peaceful picketing, its restraint must be defensible on some principle outweighing the value to the public of unhindered communication of ideas and information concerning labor's grievances.' 8
The scope of constitutional immunity from restrictions by the states
that is to be accorded to peaceful picketing is still in initial stages
of formation.1" The question arises as to whether its limits are
to be determined by the same considerations applied to other
types of free speech, such as those dealing with religious,201
political,' 1 and judicial matters, 22 or whether the industrial context of picketing is to place it in a category of its own.2'
In ordinary free speech cases it is well recognized that freedom
Sup. Ct. 735, 85 L. Ed. 1145, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 640; Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 105, 60 Sup. Ct.
736, 84
L. Ed. 1093, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW REvIW 238.
"5See Note, (1941) 29 Calif. L. Rev. 366, 375.
'.IFor discussion of this problem see Teller, Picketing and Free Speech,
(1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180; Note, (1942) 40 Mich. L. Rev. 1200; Note,
(1941) 29 Calif. L. Rev. 366; Note, (1941) 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 201; Note,
(1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 89.
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, (1925) 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571.
69 L. Ed. 1070; Cantwell v. Connecticut, (1940) 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct.
900, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 128 A. L. R. 1352 and note; Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, (1940) 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375, 127
A. L. R. 1493 and note.
-'De Jonge v. Oregon, (1937) 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed.
278, discussed in (1937) 21 MINNESOTA LAw RE;VIEW 744; Herndon v.
Lowry, (1937) 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066.
2*Bridges v. California, (1941) 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed.
14c. discussed in (1942) 26 MINNESOTA LAW RvIEW 552.
-3In Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, (1942) 315 U. S. 769, 62 Sup.
Ct. 816, 819, 86 L. Ed. 781, the Court hinted at such a possible course,
stating: "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another quite irrespective of
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects
of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation." This statement
has been termed "the first clear-cut declaration by the Supreme Court that
picketing may create difficulties warranting special regulatory measures,
which probably are not justified when freedom of speech is exercised in
other ways." See Note, (1942) 40 Mich. L. Rev. 1200, 1206.- In Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech, (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 198, the author
asserts that the Supreme Court's opinion in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, (1942) 315 U. S. 740, 62 Sup.
Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 802 "cannot be reconciled with the identification of
picketing with free speech." He points out that although the Court failed
to mention that the injunction of the Wisconsin court restrained picketing
of employees' homes, the order of the Wisconsin court was set out in the
body of the Supreme Court's decision and that its effect must have been
brought to the Court's attention. A much more decisive indication of the
view of the Supreme Court that the industrial nature of picketing induces its
differentiation from other kinds of free speech is found in Carpenters and
Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, (1942) 315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807, 86
L. Ed. 725. For a discussion of its implications see infra.
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of speech is not absolute. Utterances hampering war effort,24
interfering with the freedom of judicial decisions, 25 urging violence,26 or affronting the public decency, 27 may be prohibited. The
public interest in permitting free speech under such circumstances
is outweighed by the public interest in maintaining peace, safety,
and moral standards. Since the preservation of free speech is
considered essential to the perpetuation of American democratic
institutions, 28 the justification for any restrictive action is based
on a finding of a clear and present danger of serious substantial
2
ev il. -0

The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the right
of free speech in labor dispute cases. It has conceded that the
clash of the conflicting interests of employer and employee "inevitably implicates the well-being of the community,"0 and Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has pointed out that "the practices in a single
factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region
and affect widespread systems of marketing. ''3 From the political
viewpoint, labor speech appeared to him "indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society."3 2 The
2
,Schenk v. United States, (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63
L. Ed. 470; Abrams v. United States, (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17,
63 L. Ed. 1173; Gilbert v. Minnesota, (1920) 254 U. S.325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125,
65 L.2 Ed. 287.
Patterson v. State of Colorado, (1917) 205 U. S. 454. 27 Sup. Ct.
556, 51 L. Ed. 879; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, (1918) 247
U. S.
2 6 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186.
State v. Van Wye, (1896) 136 Mo. 227, 37 S. W. 938; State v.
Mockus, (1921) 120 Me. 84, 113 Atl. 39; Williams v. State, (1922) 130
Miss.27827, 94 So. 882.
Gitlow v. New :York, (1925) 268 U. S.652. 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed.
1138.28
See Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S.88, 103, 60 Sup. Ct. 736,
84 L. Ed. 1093, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW REvixw 238.
29". .. to justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is im-

minent . . . that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. .

.

. Only an

emergency can justify repression." See the concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, (1926) 274 U. S.357, 376, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095. For
other leading cases expounding this principle see Schenk v. United States,
(1918) 249 U. S.47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470; Gitlow v. New York,
(1925) 268 U. S. 652. 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138; Cantwell v. Connecticut, (1939) 310 U. S.296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 128 A. L. R.
1352 and note. For a discussion of the meaning of the term see Note, (1941)
27 Iowa L. Rev. 105; Note. (1940) 29 Calif. L. Rev. 366.
3OSee Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, (1942) 315 U. S.
722, 3t
62 Sup. Ct. 807, 808, 86 L. Ed. 785.
See Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S.88. 103. 60 Sup. Ct. 736,
84 L.3 Ed. 1093, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 238.
2See Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 103, 60 Sup. Ct.
736, 84 L. Ed. 1093, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESoTA LAW REVIEW 238.

NOTES

mere fact that the economic interests against which labor verbally
warred might suffer, was deemed subordinate to the interests of
the public in receiving such information.3
Since the clear and present danger principle is the constitutional
test of permissible restraints on free speech by a state, the question arises as to whether that is the yardstick which the Supreme
Cpurt has chosen to determine the permissible scope of peaceful
picketing. If it is the measure, then the mere fact that speech
activity is contrary to a state's policy would not, in the absence
of a clear and present danger to the state, justify the courts in
issuing an injunction against peaceful picketing.
The Supreme Court made it clear in the Carlson and Thornhill
Cases that state legislation forbidding peaceful picketing was
invalid as an unconstitutional prohibition of labor's right to publicize its views. The Court indicated, however, that the states were
still left with ample power to regulate certain social evils emanating from picketing activity so long as these were of the kind which
warranted interference with free speech in the form of peaceful
picketing. In the Meadowntoor Case the Court upheld an Illinois
ruling that where "acts of picketing in themselves peaceful" were
enmeshed in violence, future peaceful picketing might be enjoined;
and in Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v.
Wisconsin Einployment Relations Board34 the Court approved a
decree permitting peaceful picketing and forbidding only violence.
However, the Court has indicated that the ideas of a particular state concerning the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute are not conclusive. 35 Injunctions based on violations
of state common law or statutory standards have been held to be
a deprivation of due process when the right to free discussion has
been impaired. Thus in American Federation of Labor v. Steing36
z'1See Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 105, 60 Sup. Ct. 732,
25 MIXNESO'A LAW REVIEW 238;
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, (1941) 312 U. S. 321, 326, 61 Sup.
Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855, rehearing denied (1941) 312 U. S. 715, 61 Sup. Ct.

84 L. Ed. 1093, discussed in (1941)

735, 85 L. Ed. 1145, discussed in (1941) 25

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw

640.

24(1942) 315 U. S. 437, 62 Sup. Ct. 706, 86 L. Ed. 567. It would seem
that in contrast to the considerable amount of violence necessary, as in
the Meadowmoor Case, to justify a blanket injunction, "considerably less
violence is sufficient to justify an injunction which merely restrains the
violent acts, but permits peaceful picketing." See Note, (1942) 40 Mich.
L. Rev. 1200, 1203.
'American Federation of Labor v. Swing, (1941) 312 U. S. 321, 326.
61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855, rehearing denied (1941) 312 U. S. 715, 61
Sup. Ct. 735, 85 L. Ed. 1145, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAw

640.
36(1941) 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855, rehearing denied

REVIEW

(1941) 312 U. S. 715, 61 Sup. Ct. 735, 85 L. Ed. 1145, discussed in (1941)
25 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 640.
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the constitutional guarantee of freedom of discussion was infringed
by the common law policy of a state which forbade peaceful picketing where there was no immediate employer-employee dispute.
In Bakery & Pastry Driz'ers v. Woh 3

it was held that a state

cannot, by statute, define "labor disputes" so narrowly as to substantially confer immunity from all picketing on particular enterprises. Similarly, in Journeymen Tailors v. .3fille-rs where the
New Jersey court held that peaceful picketing in the absence of
a labor dispute rendered the picketing unlawful and therefore not
entitled to constitutional protection, an order granting an injunction was reversed by the Supreme Court. In none of these peaceful
picketing cases did the Supreme Court evidence an intention of
departing from the "clear and present danger" test. Moreover,
in Bridges v. California," a case dealing with the power of a
court to curtail criticism of the judiciary, the Supreme Court
incidentally noted that the "clear and present danger" limitation
laid down in the Thornhill Case was the same as that applied in
cases dealing with the constitutionality of convictions under the
criminal syndicalism act, the anti-insurrection act, and the espionage acts. Even though the Court approved a blanket injunction
in the Meadowmoor Case, it pointedly limited the restraint to the
time necessary to neutralize the intimidation caused by the violence, and the enjoined union was given the right to petition for
a modification of the decree after a suitable period had elapsed.
Thus the Court has strongly indicated that in a normal situation
peaceful picketing, in the absence of violence, may not be proscribed
and that, therefore, the mere fact that peaceful picketing is
illegal in manner or purpose under state law will not be a justification for its restraint if the element of violence is lacking.
In dealing with the problem of injunctions against peaceful
picketing, state courts have refused to adopt this view. Although
it has been asserted that peaceful picketing in the absence of violence may not be restricted, 40 the courts which have refused to
grant injunctions have done so by declaring that the particular
fact situations before them constituted lawful picketing by reference to holdings of the Supreme Court in passing on similar fact
37(1942) 315 U. S. 769, 62 Sup.'Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 781.
3s(1941) 312 U. S. 658, 61 Sup. Ct. 732, 85 L. Ed. 1106.
39(1941) 314 U. S.252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 149, discussed in
(1942) 26 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 552.
40Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., (1941) 286 Ky. 657, 664, 151 S.W.
(2d) 440; Heine's, Inc. v. Truck Drivers' Local No. 676, (1941) 129
N. J. Eq. 308, 312, 19 A. (2d) 204; S & W Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery
Union, (1941) 11 Wash. (2d) 262, 274, 118 P. (2d) 962; Culinary Union
No. 631 v. Busy Bee Cafe, (1941) 7 Ariz. 514, 519, 115 P. (2d) 246.
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situations ;41 while the courts which have issued injunctions against
peaceful picketing have placed their decisions squarely on the
principle that peaceful picketing to be entitled to constitutional
immunity must be carried on for a purpose and in a manner
recognized as lawful by the state. Thus peaceful picketing is unlawful and, therefore, not entitled to constitutional protection
when carried on to compel the employer to maintain a closed
shop,

'

to compel him to enter into a union contract which would

not have been valid under a state statute, 43 or to force him to discharge employees in violation of a state labor relations act.4 4 The
45
same is true where the picketing violates state anti-trust laws,
involves the use of false statements, 48 is carried on where there is
41Thus it has been held that the right to peacefully picket is not lost by
the absence of a labor dispute between the employer and his employees,
Culinary Union No. 631 v. Busy Bee Cafe, (1941) 57 Ariz. 514, 115 P. (2d)
246; Denver Local Union No. 13 v. Buckingham Transportation Co., (1941)
108 Colo. 419, 118 P. (2d) 1088; Heine's, Inc. v. Truck Drivers' Local 676,
(1941) 129 N. J. Eq. 308, 19 A. (2d) 204; S & W Fine Foods v. Retail
Delivery Union, (1941) 11 Wash. (2d) 262, 118 P. (2d) 962; Davis v.
Yates, (1941) 218 Ind. 364, 32 N. E. (2d) 86, although a breach of contract is thereby induced. Los Angeles County Fair Association v. Pomona
Valley Central Labor Council No. C-412, (Cal. Super. Ct. 1941) 8 Lab.
Rel. Ref. Man. 1108; see McReynolds v. Machinists Union, No. 11522, (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1941) 8 Lab. Rel. Ref. Man. 1104. A labor union may picket
peacefully the place of business of a person who has no employees. O'Neil
v. Building Service Union, (1941) 9 Wash. (2d) 507, 115 P. (2d) 662;
Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, Local No. 1, (1942) 315 Ill. App.
328, 43 N. E. (2d) 198. Some states have also held peaceful secondary picketing unenjoinable. Alliance Auto Service, Inc. v. Cohen, (1941) 341 Pa. 382,
19 A. (2d) 152; Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom, (1942) 193 Ga. 471,
18 S. E. (2d) 841; Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151
S. W. (2d) 440; People v. Muller, (1941) 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206.
12Schwab v. Moving Picture Operators, (1941) 165 Ore. 602, 109
P. (2d) 600; contra, McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local Union,
(1940) 16 Cal. (2d) 311, 106 P. (2d) 373, cert. denied (1941) 313 U. S.
566, 61 Sup. Ct. 939, 85 L. Ed. 1525. It has also been held that picketing
for unionization where none of the employees is a member of the union
may be enjoined. Roth v. Local Union, (1939) 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E. (2d)
280; Crosby v. Rath, (1940) 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N. E. (2d) 934, cert.
denied (1941) 312 U. S. 690, 61 Sup. Ct. 618; Shively v. Garage Employees' Local Union No. 44, (1940) 6 Wash. (2d) 560, 108 P. (2d) 354.
IaWisconsin E. R. Board v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers' & Dairy Employees' Union, Local No. 225, (1941) 238 Wis. 379, 299 N. W. 31.
-- R. H. White v. Murphy, (1942) 310 Mass. 510, 38 N. E. (2d) 685,
discussed in (1942) 26 'MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 895, 896.
41'Borden Co. v. Local No. 133, (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 152 S. W. (2d)
828. 4
(Nash v. Retail Clerks' Association, (Cal. Super. Ct. 1942) 11 L. R. R.
47; Coward Shoe, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, (1941) 177
Misc. 70, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 781; see Alliance Auto Service v. Cohen,
(1941) 341 Pa. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152; but cf. Lyons v. United Hotel Employees' C. I. 0. Local No. 440, (Cal. Super. Ct. 1941) 8 Lab. Rel. Ref.
Man. 1108, where the court distinguished between the situation in which
information was disseminated to those who were in a position to discern its
falsity and the situation in which it was disseminated to those who were not,
and refused to enjoin false statements in the former situation.
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no "trade dispute, ' 4 7 or is maintained in furtherance of an unlawful labor objective."3
The validity of the state decisions limiting the permissible area
of peaceful picketing to a category of lawfulness would be open to
doubt, 49 but for a recent case, Carpenters & Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe,50 in which the Supreme Court placed a new limitation on peaceful picketing. In the Ritter Case the plaintiff had
hired a contractor to construct a building under an agreement that
the latter was to choose his own labor. Non-union labor being
employed, a union peacefully picketed the plaintiff's restaurant, a
business which had no connection with the building under construction. As a result, the waiters refused to cross the picket
line to go to work. The Texas court declared this a violation of
state anti-trust laws and, therefore, enjoinable. This was upheld
by the Supreme Court on the ground that a state may restrain
the peaceful picketing of industry by strangers to that industry.
This case raises the question of whether the Court intended
to sanction the notion that labor speech must conform to a standard of "lawfulness" as defined by the states. This seems unlikely
in view of its recent prior decisions. It would seem more probable
that the court meant to postulate the principle that the sphere of
free labor speech must be confined to the "area of the industry
within which a labor dispute arises." 1 If this second interpretation
-7Crosby v. Rath, (1940) 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N. E. (2d) 934, cert.
denied (1941) 312 U. S. 690, 61 Sup. Ct. 618.
48Schwab v. Moving Picture Operators, (1941) 165 Ore. 602, 109
P. (2d) 600 (picketing for closed shop) ; Petrucci v. Hogan. (1941) 27
N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (picketing city for closed shop unlawful purpose since
city must follow statutory rules in hiring) ; Coward Shoe, Inc. v. Retail
Shoe Salesmen's Union, (1941) 177 Misc. 70, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 781 (picketing
to retaliate against rival union held unlawful purpose) ; Shively v. Garage
Employees' Local Union No. 44, (1940) 6 Wash. (2d) 560, 108 P. (2d)
354 (picketing employer to compel non-union employees to join union
held unlawful purpose) ; Olson v. Bakery Drivers' Union, (1940) 6 Lab.
Rel. Ref. Man. 1100 (picketing for closed shop contract an unlawful objective); Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Longley.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 160 S. W. (2d) 124 (picketing to compel signing
of a49particular contract with union).
To argue that the Constitution protects only lawful speech would be
to impart to freedom of expression only an illusory liberty, for if lawfulness
were the requisite for constitutional protection, a state could defeat freedom
of speech by segregating what it considers undesirable into a category of
unlawfulness. See Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941) p. 14.
"If picketing is a form of free speech, it may not be enjoined although
carried on for an improper objective." Teller, Picketing and Free Speech,
(1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 196.
50(1942) 315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 785.
51
In the Swing Case, Illinois was not allowed to limit peaceful picketing to places where there is a labor dispute between employer and employee.
Here Texas might constitutionally limit labor speech to the situation in

NOTES

is correct, it would seem that peaceful picketing with false banners,
if within that area, is entitled to constitutional protection. For,
although there is little doubt that the use of false banners or
statements in connection with picketing is unlawful 5 2 none of the
courts which have refused to allow a prior restraint on free
speech has distinguished between truth or falsity. To the contrary,
there is ample authority for the proposition that freedom from
prior restraint extends to the false as well as to the true. 53 However, an indication that the Supreme Court may deviate from this
rule in the case of peaceful picketing is demonstrated by its dictum
in the Thornhill Case to the effect that a state may have power
to regulate the accuracy of statements made during the picketing.54
In view of the fact that the Court in the Ritter Case enjoined a
particular mode of labor speech which was antagonistic to the
state's policy, namely, picketing of strangers to the industry, the
states which have in the past restricted the content of labor speech,
which the disputants were part of the same industry. Apparently then,
picketing is only free speech when it is restricted "to the area of the
industry within which a labor dispute arises." Further strength is given this
interpretation by the fact that the Court expressly left open to the disputants
"other traditional modes of communication." If a union may constitutionally
inform the public by radio that an employer in one industry is unfair to
labor in another, but cannot do so by picketing, it is obvious that the Court
recognizes as inherent in the nature of the latter an element not present in
the former. The Ritter decision would seem to be an acceptance of the fact
that it "is not what the picket says, but his locus in quo which proximately
causes the desired result." See the concurring opinion of Robinson, C. J.
in S & W Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Union, (1941) 11 Wash. (2d)
262, 118 P. (2d) 962.
Theoretically, the test employed by the Court in circumscribing the
area of permissible peaceful picketing-that of "economic interdependence"
between the industry and the picketing union-may be beyond reproach, but
hard practicality deserves some consideration. As Mr. Justice Reed points
out, by whom is the test of "eligibility" to picket to be determinedby labor or by enterprise? Moreover, it is permissible to picket retailers
of a product distributed by the employer with whom the union quarrels on
the ground that he receives the benefit of lower prices as a result of the
lower wages paid by the employer. Cf. Alliance Auto Service, Inc. v. Cohen,
(1941) 341 Pa. St. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152; Goldfinger v. Feintuch, (1937)
276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910. Is there ground for a distinction which
permits restraining picketing of a person who, by contracting with an employer of non-union labor, enjoys a lower cost? See Note, (1942) 40 Mich.
L. Rev.
1200, 1211.
. 52People v. Jenkins, (1930) 138 Misc. 498. 246 N. Y. S. 444, aff'd
(1931) 255 N. Y. 637, 175 N. E. 348; People v. Kaye, (1937) 165 Misc. 663,
1 N. Y. S. (2d) 354.
':See the cases cited in footnote 15. See Patterson v. Colorado, (1907)
205 U. S. 454. 462, 27 Sup. Ct. 556. 51 L. Ed. 879; cf. Marx & Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, (1902) 168 Mo. 133, 149, 67 S. W. 391, 56 L. R. A. 951,
90 Am. St. Rep. 440.
'See Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940) 310 U. S.88, 99; 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84
L. Ed. 1093, discussed in (1941) 25 MfINNEsOTA LAw REVIEw 238.
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when antagonistic to the state's policy, may possibly feel themselves vindicated in taking such a step.
It is submitted that while under the Ritter Case the complete
identification of peaceful picketing with free speech has been in
part obliterated, injunctions against peaceful picketing with false
banners are open to the same objections to prior restraint present
in the "pure" type of free speech case.
3. TiE OBJECTION OF JUDICIAL CENSORSHIP
If judges were models of judicial objectivity, capable of infallibly branding utterances either true or false without the discoloration of human prejudice based on personal, economic and
social views, the decision in the instant case would not be open to
the objection that it seriously endangers the right of labor to
publish its side of a dispute by peaceful picketing. But in false
bannering cases it is likely that, in passing on the truth of such
statements as "unfair, '" "traitor,"' " "scab,"57 "strike," s or "strikebreaker," 59 a judge's decisions will often be swayed by his own
personal conception of desirable social ends."' Moreover, the fact
that as a rule the judiciary is far more sensitive to the damage
resulting from picketing than to the harm done by its restraint
has always been a disturbing problem. 61 In the instant case the
55Denver Local Union v. Perry Truck Lines, (1940) 106 Colo. 25, 101
P. (2d) 436; Alliance Auto Service v. Cohen, (1941) 341 Pa. 283, 19 A.
(2d) 6152.
5 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, (1925) 315 I1. 140, 145 N. E. 657.
oNann v. Raimquist, (1931) 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690, discussed
in (1931) 16 MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 118; Wood Mowing & Reaping
Machine Co. v. Toohey, (1921) 114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y. S. 95.

5SPeople v. Tepel, (1938) 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 779; Philip-Henrici Co. v.
Alexander, (1916) 198 Ill. App. 568; Harvey v. Chapman, (1917) 226
Mass. 191, 115 N. E. 304.
59State v. Zanker, (1930) 179 Minn. 355, 229 N. W. 311.
60"There is something fantastic about a process of dealing with strikes
and boycotts that entrusts arbitrament to the possible error of an individual
judge. . . . One who reads the fervid opinions of not a few of the trial
judges must wonder whether the writer was in any mood to hear evidence objectively and to decide dispassionately." Powell. The Supreme
Court's Control Over the Issuance of Injunctions in Labor Disputes,
(1928) 2 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 733, 764. In Nana v.
Raimquist, (1931) 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690, discussed in (1931) 16
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 118, Mr. Justice Cardozo, taking the position
that such statements merely represent a point of view, stated, "Courts have
enough to do in restricting physical disorder without busying themselves
with logomachies in which the embattled words are the expression of
the writer or the speaker."
6
The familiar statement in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, (C.C.
S.D. Iowa 1905) 139 Fed. 582, 584, 140 Fed. 153 (proceedings for contempt)
-"There is, and can be, no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than
there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or unlawful lynching."finds itself almost equalled by the statement in a California case where the
court said: "Truth is that the term 'peaceful picketing' is a self contradiction
and aptly describes nothing known to man. To use the term is as inept as
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court stressed the fact that no exception was taken to the trial
court's finding that the statement on the banner, that there was a
strike in progress, was false. In these cases the protection by
appellate review of the finding of falsity is of little value, since
by the time an order for an injunction is reversed a strike may
have been broken and its purpose defeated. Though erroneous,
an injunction issued by a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and persons must be obeyed until it is modified or set
aside by the court entering the order or until it is reversed by an
appellate court on penalty of the invocation of contempt proceedings. 2 This is an additional hardship since the judge who may
have issued the injunction, sitting alone, determines whether a
violation has occurred and may mete out criminal punishment
without giving the victim the jury safeguard privileged to him in
a criminal trial.
CONCLUSION

Even though peaceful picketing is regarded as protected to the
same extent as other forms of expression by the guarantee of
freedom of speech, it may be enjoined when it is used as the means
of committing some other unlawful act, such as threat of violence
as in the Meadowmoor Case or violation of an anti-trust act as
in the Ritter Case. To hold further that the falsity of the statement made under circumstances which would preclude an injunction
against a true statement makes the picketing wrongful so as to
permit it to be restrained, applies to expression by picketing a
limitation not recognized as authorizing restraint of other forms
of publication.
Decisions such as those in the instant case substitute state control by injunction for competitive discussion of matters of particular interest to both labor and the consumer public. In a greater
share of situations the employer is amply protected by a civil
action for compensation or by criminal' prosecution. He has at
his elbow, moreover, the means of neutralizing by counterpublicity any misrepresentations that may occur during the labor
controversy. Such decisions imply a lack of confidence in the
ability of the American public to segregate falsehood from truthan implication unjustified in an industrial era in which the-consumer public is alive to the technique and dialectics of industrial
struggle. *
would be to speak of a peaceful holdup or a peaceful war. It is an alliterative euphemism, coined possibly through carelessness, but seized upon avidly
by legislators and judges, thus to make it e6sy to give blanket approval to
practices, many of which are plainly immoral. .. ." Ted R. Cooper Co.,
Inc. v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, (1941) 7 Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.

706, 707.
2

6 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, (1925)

315 Ill. 40, 145 N. E. 657.

